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abstract: What role should sentient animals play in the current debate 
on enhancement? The question covers several different philosophical 
fronts that demand urgent global ethical analysis. This touches issues that 
go from prohibition, permissivity or obligation that should characterize 
the new biotechnologies oriented to the enhancement of individuals, to 
the debate surrounding the moral rights of animals. Furthermore, the 
difficulty arises not only from the controversial moral categories involved, 
but also from the very extent of the objective proposed. However, this 
also gives rise to the pertinence of the above-mentioned question posed 
at the outset: on the one hand, the need for consistency in an eminently 
biased debate, and on the other the need to justify the proposal in which 
all sentient individuals are legitimate protagonists without this necessar-
ily leading to implausible scenarios.
Keywords: nonhuman animals, cognitive disabilities, cognitive en-
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1. oBJectIve coGNItIve eNhaNceMeNt
If we had the necessary resources and technology could we, from a 
moral standpoint, disregard the possibility of making people happier or 
more intelligent, surpassing the therapy threshold? The boundaries be-
tween therapy and enhancement are not as sharply defined as might be 
deduced from some arguments. Rather, the key may be the possibility of 
making qualitative changes, and not just quantitative ones, as it is clear 
that an interest in modulating or enhancing individual features has always 
accompanied humans (e.g., the traditional use of psychostimulants to 
augment cognitive capabilities such as memory and concentration).
It is the responsibility of applied ethics to face this debate without 
eluding the vast theoretical-practical difficulties involved, given the far-
reaching questions related to both our very human identity as well as to 
the radical implicit social and political consequences (Savulescu, ter Meu-
len & Kahane 2011, and Savulescu & Bostrom 2009). In this sense, the 
new biotechnologies under development promise debate far beyond the 
implications of a la carte enhancement focused on satisfying certain in-
dividual needs; they reach a more public context, where the categories 
involved have to do with our understanding of distributive justice, equal-
ity of opportunities, our obligations as well as rights as parents, and our 
moral obligations towards persons with disabilities.
The notable fact is, given that naturally arising individual situations 
are so different at the outset, enhancement techniques could be conceived 
as a tool to provide more equality. Equality is interpreted here as the best 
way to ensure the same access to certain goods that are objectively re-
lated to individual wellbeing. Before we insist on the justification of the 
relationship between enhancement, equality of opportunities, and wellbe-
ing, the matter bears illustrating with an example. Let us consider the 
practices of doping in competitive sports. The media treatment of this 
issue usually places public opinion on the side of a concept of fair play in 
which any practice involving the artificial alteration of the starting situa-
tion of the athlete is evaluated as morally wrong. Renowned sports theo-
rists have also defended a critical focus of doping. C. Tamburrini (2002) 
affirmed that this practice has a harmful effect on sports, as it eliminates 
all elements of emotion and uncertainty, making the efforts of athletes 
unnecessary to achieve good results, and eliminating the spirit of sports 
practice. However, Tamburrini admits that new technologies of genetic 
manipulation may serve to correct the physical defects that limit sports 
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practice, thereby increasing the capabilities needed for competitive sports. 
We should note that behind the acceptance of enhancement technologies 
there is recognition of the need to equalize the different starting situations 
of individual athletes. What needs to be clarified is why this demand to 
fight for equal opportunities is not applied by Tamburrini when analyz-
ing doping.
But how should we evaluate the fact that starting situations are so dif-
ferent? A more exhaustive and less arbitrary analysis on doping might 
allow us to view this practice as a good way to introduce an equalising 
element into the starting situation and as the only factor that really guar-
antees fair competition. Beyond the use of doping substances, emerging 
biological technologies foster equality of opportunities in the starting 
situation, bringing about, for example, substantial changes in genetic 
makeup. In addition, the level of dedication or discipline could be objec-
tively appraised, knowing that individual sports results depend on per-
sonal effort and do not rest on some arbitrary mechanism of natural 
chance. Therefore, if general access is allowed to some treatments that, 
in sports practice, prove useful to reach certain results, then the effort 
would no longer be a moot point. Despite what critics have held, rather 
the contrary would result – that is, effort would become more essential 
inasmuch as the capacities of athletes would become more equalised. With 
the natural arbitrary differences among participants being corrected, ef-
fort, dedication, and sacrifice would become determinant in competition 
(Pérez Triviño 2013; 2011: 198-201).
We could defend the legitimacy of a similar argumentation in the 
context of access to wellbeing. If we value equality in the sense shown in 
the above argumentation regarding sports, then the possibility of ensuring 
the same opportunities of individual satisfaction through nano-bio-info-
cognitive technologies should come to be considered an urgent issue in 
applied ethics. Clearly, sports practice and opportunities of wellbeing are 
hardly related in this sense. However, the comparison should serve to 
establish that the two cases bear particularities that justify a parallel 
analysis. These particularities are related to the underlying idea of equal-
ity of opportunities and to the emphasis on the distributive aspects in our 
society. On the other hand, we should also warn that when we refer to 
the intention of achieving more equality in the context of individual 
wellbeing, this does not imply having to pursue a universal concept 
of wellbeing. We speak of opportunities as the manner of ensuring dif-
ferent options of satisfaction, and understanding such freedom of choice 
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as a primary good that is in and of itself compatible with the different life 
plans possible.
2. the Moral relevaNce of coGNItIve INeQualItIes
Let us consider cognitive disabilities. Would lack of access to certain 
complex forms of wellbeing not perhaps be interpreted as unjustifiable 
discrimination, given the current possibility of making radical cognitive 
improvements? Within genetic enhancement, cognitive enhancement 
refers to the broadening of the spectrum of mental capabilities by the 
development of internal or external systems dedicated to the processing 
of information. This scenario is clearly possible. At present, there is still 
no direct connection between certain genes and cognitive enhancement. 
However, the difficulties in controlling epigenetic expression do not in-
validate a theoretic analysis concerning the possibilities opened by new 
biotechnological developments. The most widely studied technical ap-
plications have to do with well-known gene therapy, where the aim is 
to cure illnesses by acting directly on the genes involved. In this thera-
peutical context, the most common practice is embryonic selection in 
order to avoid the manifestation of diseases when the progenitors are 
carriers of the genes involved in the disorders. The selection of healthy 
embryos is a far different practice from the gene selection to control the 
expression of certain pathologies. In turn, beyond therapy lies the objec-
tive of bolstering individual capacities.
Therefore, the incipient development of technology focused on the 
genetic manipulation of individuals allows us to examine the possibility 
of qualitatively augmenting cognitive capacities, which in turn, are re-
lated to the quality of wellbeing available to each individual.
The adoption of a moderately objectivistic viewpoint moves us to state 
that some lives are better than others. We could say that the life of someone 
with a normal cognitive level is better than that of someone whose genetic 
makeup impedes the individual, for example, from relating to others in a 
satisfactory way. In addition, we could speak of authenticity, in the sense 
of self-discovery of our individual capacities and characteristics, as a valu-
able element for leading a good life and necessarily linked to a comprehen-
sion of ourselves that demands a certain type of cognitive capacity.
This line of arguments leads us further. We would suggest the viabil-
ity of enhancing the lives of human beings less fortunate in the natural 
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lottery (for a question of justice), using for this all the means available, 
including emerging biotechnology. Now, if we admit that sentient animals 
also form part of the moral community, would we have to admit this 
same moral responsibility towards them? If our relationships with them 
are also governed by rational rather than arbitrary criteria, then it would 
not be irrelevant to ask whether in their case, the demands of equality 
also require cognitive enhancement.
A certain similarity can be recognised in the historical development 
of our attitude towards the cognitively disabled and towards animals 
(Gracia 1996). Both cases involve individuals outside the moral commu-
nity, where the moral agents are the only ones that have obligations to 
one another. The imposition of an ethic of the contractualist type has 
marked our relations with all individuals incapable of establishing recipro-
cal obligations with us. Although currently the moral treatment of the 
two groups is quite differentiated (the turning point occurred towards 
the middle of the 20th century, when a new attitude of normalisation of 
disability emerged), the cognitive similarity between the disabled and 
animals supports the joint treatment of the question of the content of our 
moral obligations towards both groups. Therefore, this thesis needs to 
be qualified. Despite the fact that a historical parallelism must be recog-
nised, the situation of cognitively disabled individuals is different in the 
sense that there has been a historical tendency toward certain indirect 
obligations toward them (emphasising our moral responsibility to these 
individuals to prevent the violation of rights among moral agents).
3. overcoMING the DIchotoMous DeBate
If we endorse a specific ethical-political schema calling for the obliga-
tion to correct disadvantages, how can this not be also upheld in the sphere 
of genetic makeup? If new enhancement technologies open this possibil-
ity, then, so long as we find no reasons against it, we will have to count 
on the great potential equaliser that they constitute.
What might be these reasons? The bioconservative thesis directly op-
poses the idea of altering important biological characteristics of human 
beings (Fukuyama 2003, and Habermas 2003). In some cases, authors 
refer to threats that such alterations could pose for human nature and 
dignity. One of the keys to explaining the anti-enhancement trend could 
be intuition concerning the vision of nature as a wise entity. As expressed 
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by N. Bostrom & A. Sandberg (2009), it seems that the type of argu-
mentation used by bioconservatives and the main moral principles of the 
middle level involved are based, though perhaps not explicitly, on this 
interpretation and on the intuition that derives from the implicit recogni-
tion of the wisdom of nature. In others cases, it is warned that enhance-
ment represents a trend of dominion oriented toward remaking nature in 
such a way as to serve our purposes and to satisfy our desires – a question-
able aim in and of itself and one which furthermore has disastrous con-
sequences at all levels (Sandel 2004, 2007). Against this, it is of interest 
to see the way in which F. Kamm (2009) deems the rebuttal of the criti-
cisms of Sandel reasonable.
It is not difficult to see that such a critical position with respect to any 
procedure of enhancement could be considered less than rigorous. In 
addition, there is the possibility of seeking the moral enhancement of our 
children. Reinforcing the individual motivations for the moral agency 
would imply reinforcing, in turn, the freedom of others, to make it pos-
sible for them to pursue their own goals. For Thomas Douglas (2008), 
if one of the strongest objections against biomedical enhancement points 
to the damages that this could provoke in others, moral enhancement 
could be interpreted as a counterexample to the idea that this type of 
technology is always morally unallowable. This would also be the case 
for the undeniable good results that would be provided by such particu-
lar modifications of individuals (Faust 2008, and Campos Serena 2010: 
45-59). In this context, some, in fact, hold that moral enhancement is the 
key to the survival of our world (Persson & Savulescu 2012).
The same argument can be posed in the other extreme. The transhu-
manist tendency defends an unconditional search for enhancement of 
human beings by new biomedical technologies. Within this movement, 
there is a more moderate version that interprets improvements as mor-
ally permissible but not obligatory (Agar 2003, and Kamm 2005). 
Other authors have defended a stronger version of this proposal (Sa-
vulescu 2001, 2006, and 2007).
The sphere for applying new biotechnologies is so varied that it seems 
necessary to recognise that different moral categories can be involved in 
the same case, demanding a more careful analysis of the peculiarities. 
Otherwise, the ethical-political debate turns into an futile theoretic dispute 
between defenders and detractors.
The variables to be used in a more detailed analysis reflect that the 
differences of each technological application go beyond the quantitative. 
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The different qualitative aspects involved demand a decisional model 
complex enough to accommodate each particularity and include in the 
evaluation the social, spatial, and temporal elements that appear to be 
overlooked in traditional dichotomous analyses.
4. eQualIty as oPPortuNItIes of WellBeING
In querying here about cognitive enhancement, we are demanding an 
exhaustive analysis in the terms mentioned. This signifies that, from the 
outset, we cannot neglect the theoretic assumptions underlying the idea 
that there could be a moral prescription for genetically enhancing the lives 
of the less fortunate in the natural lottery. The connection that we estab-
lish between equality, opportunities of wellbeing, and cognitive capacities 
is related to a wellbeing approach from which the search for the best life 
possible becomes the primordial aim of the good use of biotechnology.
To refer to opportunities for wellbeing, far from implying the need to 
identify the specific intrinsic goods experienced at a given moment, means 
emphasising the particular individual capacities for wellbeing. Having 
greater capacities in this sense implies expanding the field of possibilities 
related to wellbeing. The greater and more diverse the array of opportuni-
ties, the greater the possibility of gaining valuable things that go beyond 
the most basic pleasure (Verhoog 1992: 147-160). Clearly, to assume that 
the lives with the most possibilities in this sense are especially worthwhile 
implies adopting a sufficiently objectivist schema regarding the value of 
lives. The question is how to combine this idea with a plausible account 
of harm, where the most reasonable would probably be to consider that 
a thing is bad if it provokes a negative mental state in an individual. How 
can the necessary coherence between objectivism and subjectivism be 
achieved? John Stuart Mill posed this question and responded with a 
theory in which there are certain types of pleasant sensations qualitatively 
superior to those coming from the satisfaction of physical needs or unso-
phisticated desires, and where the justification of this superiority is given 
by the subjective individual preferences of those who can experience the 
entire spectrum of wellbeing. He said (Mill 1863: Chapter II):
“Of two pleasures […] If one of the two is, by those who are competently 
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even 
though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and 
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would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature 
is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superior-
ity in quality, so far outweighing of small account. […] Few human creatures 
would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of 
the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures. […] It is better to be a human being 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied”.
The choice by Mill of the type of wellbeing that is associated with the 
more intellectual aspects is justified by appealing to the test of the expert 
(also known as the competent judges test). D. Holbrook (1988: 96-101) 
has delved into the role of this test in the theory of Mill. Simplifying, this 
is a strategy that rests on a hypothetical argument, from which it is main-
tained that if an individual were capable of enjoying the two types of 
pleasant experiences, that individual would always choose the higher type.
Thus, to take into account the heterogeneity of wellbeing (which is 
made possible by a certain level of psychological sophistication) enables 
us to recognise that those beings capable of experiencing one type of 
qualitatively superior wellbeing will have one type of preferable existence. 
This recognition is justified by the fact that the option for such a type of 
life rests on subjective preferences. The counterexamples are explained 
by the lack of a sufficient degree of knowledge concerning the range of 
alternatives, and also the limitations about real opportunities that would 
have to be taken into account. However, Mill warns (1863: Chapter II), 
the choices made from the lack of information and from restricted access 
to certain resources (e.g., health, education) do not have to lead us to 
review what we understand as the better life.
If we were willing to accept this analysis, we would have found a way 
of supporting the idea that some lives are objectively better than others 
for the individuals themselves and that this appears to be related to the 
possibility of having a sufficient level of psychological sophistication to 
ensure a broad spectrum of opportunities for wellbeing. If so, then it 
would be necessary to recognise, in the enhancements, an instrumental 
character with respect to certain objective goods which would make them 
difficult to question; this is because the enhancements would increase the 
primary goods. That is, in the Rawlsian style, this implies ensuring the 
exercise of basic rights or freedoms, related to certain general goods that 
any rational agent would consider desirable, regardless of the agent’s 
conception of good or of their life plan (Allhof 2005). Cognitive enhance-
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ment would fall within this category in all cases in which, as occurs with 
cognitive disabilities, there is a disadvantageous situation that can be 
corrected.
5. the coNtroversy aBout the fuNctIoNal DIversIty
The main historical trends in the conception of disability have been 
developed, on the one hand, in the medical model (taking a biological 
focus meant to eliminate what is perceived as an individual problem), and 
on the other in the social model (accentuating the need to modify the 
environment as the best way to overcome disability, interpreted as a social 
construct) (Barnes & Mercer 2010). However, the most current propos-
als seek to confront the limitations imposed by such reductionist models 
and overcome these to propose new models that can take into account 
the multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon of disability (Seoane 2011: 
143-161).
Thus arose the model of functional diversity, which tries to convert 
variation into a moral category by itself. The idea is to value disability 
for itself, considering it a feature of human diversity and an important 
factor of social enrichment. The aim is to abandon social measures that 
tend towards homogenisation (by policies of assimilation and compensa-
tion) to move towards acceptance of every disability (difference) with all 
its consequences. The theoretic assumptions on which this model is de-
veloped are based on the idea that in this sense, acceptance of diversity 
implies understanding that the particular features associated with disabil-
ity do not impede the disabled from achieving a good life, on the plane 
of individual satisfaction.
But do we really have to be willing to recognise that all distinctive 
features can be equally universalised? Equality of opportunities should 
ensure the same possibility of attaining the primary goods that would 
permit each particular ideal of life to be developed. To hold that real 
equality emerges through a different understanding of persons with mi-
nority characteristics proves too simplistic. Without a doubt, the real 
consequences that such characteristics would bring about in practice are 
overlooked, as is the fact that many difficulties do not disappear by a 
change of paradigm. Being conscious of this implies being serious about 
the possibility that achieving real equality requires being open to new 
enhancement techniques. Although there are many different ways of 
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living in the world, to increase the intellectual capacities of those who are 
disadvantaged in this sense would imply a move towards a more fair so-
ciety in which each individual would have the same opportunities of 
being happy in the manner that each chooses.
What appears to be behind the argument presented is the idea that 
individuals with a cognitive disability would suffer some type of extrinsic 
harm if we have the possibility of boosting their opportunities of wellbe-
ing but we fail to do so. This means achieving, in their case (individuals 
arbitrarily unfortunate in the natural lottery), a broader range of oppor-
tunities of wellbeing, for a question of justice (ensuring equality of op-
portunities) and because it also functions as a condition that makes pos-
sible other valuable things.
6. seNtIeNt NoNhuMaN aNIMals
All individuals in question who are members of the moral commu-
nity (subjects of moral rights) should be governed by this argumentative 
scheme and its practical prescriptions. We have anticipated that sentient 
nonhuman animals form part of this group. If we have included them 
from the outset of this debate, it is because the most consistent moral 
paradigm is one which overcomes anthropocentric prejudice, and in which 
all those capable of suffering from the actions of others deserve moral 
protection. Of course, this needs to be justified. Here, we defend the 
logic of extending moral consideration to those who may suffer from 
actions by others (although there are many differences in the understand-
ing of our specific responsibilities as moral agents), and criticise the il-
logical continuation of ruling ourselves by the traditional Kantian con-
structivist paradigm (Lara & Campos 2015, Campos Serena 2011, and 
Lara 2006). The most arbitrary formulation of the anthropocentric 
proposal is the one that does not concede moral entity to animals simply 
because they are not human. This is an inadmissible argument because 
of the fact that belonging to a category or not, in this case the Homo 
sapiens species, cannot by itself constitute a reason for moral differen-
tiation. To discriminate only according to the species is as arbitrary as to 
do so based on race or gender. This anachronistic paradigm implies that 
moral relations can take place only between rational beings that understand 
the rules of the moral game. However, to propose the capacity of moral 
reasoning as the characteristic that provides moral rights, in addition to 
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being arbitrary, gives rise to an inconsistent proposal. Its logical conse-
quence is that human beings incapable of moral reciprocity (as is the case 
with babies and the cognitively disabled) are denied such status. The 
argument of marginal cases explicitly explains the inconsistency, show-
ing that humanists are willing to recognise only the consequences of 
adopting moral rationality as a criterion for animals, but not for humans 
incapable of satisfying it (Dombrowski 1997).
There is a reality, directly connected with ethics that should not be 
overlooked. That is, many less rational individuals, humans or not, may 
be harmed by the actions of fully rational agents (Peter Singer (1975, 
2009) has exhaustively detailed the different modalities of animal suffer-
ing provoked by humans). However, anthropocentric prejudice also 
leads to questioning real capacities of nonhumans to the point of doubt-
ing whether or not they really can suffer. René Descartes began the 
philosophical trend that persists to the present, in which animals are 
considered mere automatons, without any mental capacity to have un-
pleasant mental states. Although the only pain that we can really experi-
ence is our own, we usually escape solipsism by postulating a relevant 
behavioural and physiological similarity between others and us. This 
similarity persists in the case of nonhumans. The relevance of behav-
ioural and physiological similarity beyond human beings has been repeat-
edly defended by philosophers and biologists (Singer 1975: 46-9, Perrett 
1997: 49-58, and Bateson 1991). Especially the neurophysiological 
similarity between humans and animals has been widely documented 
(Walker 1983). On the other hand, we can find strong arguments in 
favour of animal consciousness (Bortolotti 2008: 12-3, and Searle 1994) 
and against an excessively linguistic proposal of the theory of belief-desire 
(Davidson 1980).
The criteria traditionally proposed to identify the individuals that 
should concern, from the moral standpoint, do not manage to reach the 
questionable anthropocentric goal of finding some characteristic that 
satisfies all and only human beings. This usually appeals to a certain 
degree of moral rationality, moving away from the essence of morality. 
The moral seeks to justify rules with the essential element of avoiding 
what harms others. If so, then it makes little sense to try to protect only 
the most rational individuals from harm. Instead, the important point 
would be whether or not an individual suffered from the actions of oth-
ers. The capacity to suffer is the relevant characteristic for moral con-
siderability. It appears then that it is possible to base ethics on the 
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maxim of avoiding suffering. This maxim, on being combined with the 
requisite of impartiality of moral rules (that is, of which are applicable 
to all similar cases regardless of who is involved), and with the factual 
evidence that the moral agents are not the only ones that can suffer from 
our behaviour, becomes a simple but strict principle of equality. This is 
a principle where the same interests should count equally, regardless of 
race, sex, or species. This principle of equal consideration of interests 
should be conceived as a structural proposal, compatible with very dif-
ferent normative developments such as the one that accords special rel-
evance to distributive aspects.
The sketched argument enables us to maintain that the group of the 
less fortunate, which need to be attended to from the standpoint of justice, 
is formed not only by certain human beings with cognitive disability but 
also by sentient nonhuman animals, which legitimately are a part of the 
moral community.
7.  the PrescrIPtIoN of eNhaNceMeNt aND the 
INtroDuctIoN of the sPatIal eleMeNt
The question concerning the relationship that should exist between 
justice and other goods continues to generate vigorous debate; however, 
if we show a disposition to understand that equality of opportunities 
should have a vital role in current societies, then we have to be willing to 
recognise a prescription of cognitive enhancement in the case of animals 
if we assume the same for the intellectually disabled. Until now, genetic 
techniques have been used mainly to create transgenic animals as experi-
mental subjects; a counter objective to the one suggested here (Appleby 
1998: 255-273, Loew 1994: 3-5, Poole 1995: 81-85, and Smith 2002: 
55-71).
This argument urges us to understand the need to amplify the capac-
ity for wellbeing of all individuals that can experience such a thing and 
that are in a disadvantageous starting point, regardless of the species to 
which they belong.
Clearly, our intuitions raise an alert: How can we agree with the inten-
tion to make such a drastic change in the capacities of animals? However, 
we should be willing to treat the question from a rational perspective, 
preventing prejudices from dominating the argumentation. N. Holtug 
(2007: 21) expresses this in the following terms:
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I am myself inclined to accept the implications of prioritarianism with respect 
to non-human animals. While these implications may seem counterintuitive, 
the ‘counterintuitiveness’ may very well be due to speciecist –and so unreliable– 
intuitions about fairness. Thus, I do not find it counterintuitive that justice 
requires us to give priority to people who have severe cognitive disabilities and 
short lives, and are for this reason much worse off than others. It is therefore 
up to prioritarians (and egalitarians) who do not find the relevant implications 
of prioritarianism (and egalitarianism) acceptable to come up with a version of 
one of these principles that does not imply them. But, as I have argued, this 
may not be an easy task.
This does not signify that we must necessarily recognise the plausibil-
ity of this analysis; however we should provide reasons if we wish to 
question what appears to be a logical derivation of the presented pro-
posal. Such reasons could point to the major practical difficulties that, in 
relation to the egalitarian distribution of any emerging technology, 
techniques of individual enhancement also provoke. Though the initial 
intent is to offset the lacking elements of those individuals that suffer more 
deprivation for their genetic makeup, the result of a bad distribution of 
the new resource may further exacerbate the inequality. However, this 
cannot function as an objection but rather as a warning concerning the 
need to pursue the best possible strategy for the dissemination of innova-
tion. In this sense, it is especially representative the personal proposal of 
Allen Buchanan (2011: 243-279). The author, in a highly worthwhile 
proposal, interprets the matter as a question that needs to be approached 
from an institutional standpoint. Thus, he proposes the creation of an 
institute called GIJI (Global Institute for Justice in Innovation), focused 
on managing incentives for innovation, but especially to promote, with 
highly diverse strategies, a just distribution that avoids the current eco-
nomic, political, and social impact in terms of inequality. It is only an 
example, but his analysis reveals the urgency of adding to the debate a 
spatial element that fosters reflection on the importance of expanse, 
specifically, areas in which the new biotechnological techniques should 
be applied. The question cannot be focused on a certain group of indi-
viduals (who will probably already be the most privileged), but rather 
general access should be sought, and not only in the geographical sense. 
The recognition of this spatial element as the only way of ensuring an 
egalitarian distribution of technology, extends to all individuals that form 
the moral community as holders of rights (sentient nonhuman animals 
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included). Furthermore, there would even be major repercussions in the 
context of procreation. The case known as the argument of the procrea-
tive beneficence (Savulescu 2001, and 2007) proposes that couples or 
reproductive individuals should select the child, from all the possible 
children that they could have, for which they would hope would have 
the best life (within a welfarist context) or, at least, a life as good as 
other possible lives, based on the relevant information available.
The aspect of interest is to verify that the way of responding to the 
objection, regarding the possibility that enhancement engenders more 
inequality, brings us to the crucially problematic question. This question 
deals with the real consequences of truly managing to take charge of the 
spatial element mentioned above. The existence of the moral prescription 
of cognitively enhancing sentient animals proves to be clearly counter-
intuitive, but this is not reason enough to question it. However, it would 
be a reason to continue reflecting. If the indicated moral prescription is 
what seems to be deduced to pursue (with all the means available) the aim 
of providing the most fair scenario, then maybe we should rethink this 
aim or find a way to question the extent of the obligation of enhancing 
animals.
8. the caPaBIlItIes aPProach
The capabilities theory of Martha Nussbaum (2007: 9-96) rests on 
normative assumptions that could illuminate this latter possibility. The 
author questions the conception of person postulated from contractual-
ism, where human beings are exclusively related through pursuing mu-
tual benefit. For Nussbaum, on the other hand, the fact that certain in-
dividuals cannot contribute to social wellbeing in the same way is not a 
sufficient reason for leaving them outside the borders of justice. This 
would imply discrimination of those with serious cognitive disabilities, 
of nonhuman animals, and of developing countries. Her objective is to 
establish certain fundamental rights for which political actors can take 
charge of the basic justice and not have to pursue the maximisation of the 
overall good (which would mean having a particular comprehensive 
concept of good). Thus, this involves identifying the capabilities of indi-
viduals to ensure them the opportunities necessary to be able to act ac-
cordingly. The principles of justice, she admits, should include the least 
rational humans and sentient nonhuman animals, although they cannot 
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participate in the establishment of these principles. She recognises the 
moral obligation of including animals in our considerations of justice. In 
this sense she proposes the acceptance of the criterion of sensitivity (Nuss-
baum 2007: 325-408), which is usually established from utilitarian posi-
tions, and then moves on to take the whole set of their capabilities into 
account in order to specify the political scenario that would permit its 
flourishing (nevertheless, we must know that later the author nuances 
her position with respect to animals as ends in and of themselves (Nuss-
baum 2011: cap. 8)).
Would the capabilities approach serve the aim of limiting the obliga-
tion of cognitive enhancement only to humans that have been less for-
tunate, in this sense, in the natural lottery? The author speaks of flour-
ishing to refer to the adequate development of those capacities that 
characterise individuals. Humans need the principles of justice required 
that allow access to the set of capabilities that characterise them as humans. 
In this sense, for the disabled, Nussbaum demands the development of 
their potential so that they can reach the same levels of opportunities as 
others. In this sense she states: “So society is instructed to make it pos-
sible for people to have all the capabilities of this list –not because of 
social productivity, but because it is humanly good. All citizens should 
have the chance to develop the full range of human powers […]”. Nuss-
baum (2007: 218).
Apart from the personal position of the author of the capabilities 
approach, it could not be denied that making use of current bioenhance-
ment technologies would be the best way to guarantee the conditions 
needed for the disabled to develop a way of life in accordance with their 
nature but that the natural lottery denied them. If we disregard the role 
of these techniques for the disabled and we concern ourselves only with 
ensuring adequate space for the development of their given capabilities, 
then the mere realisation of these given capabilities, in those cases, would 
give rise to situations so disadvantageous that we would have to admit 
our failure to provide equality of opportunities (although without refer-
ence to the possibility of broadening the spectrum of capabilities, A. Di 
Tullio (2013: 51-68) has pointed out this specific difficulty in Nussbaum’s 
proposal).
The fact that the disabled do not have the entire spectrum of capa-
bilities attributable to human beings and required for their flourishing 
enables us to establish a difference between them and animals of equal 
cognitive level. A difference that could imply that only in the former case 
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the necessity to take seriously the possibility of achieving a political sce-
nario that ensures the adequate development of relevant capabilities re-
mains.
But, then, would we have succeeded in showing that there is a funda-
mental difference between disabled humans and nonhuman animals? What 
seems to be under the argument is a Species-Norm Account of fortune, 
according to which a being is more o less fortunate comparing his/her 
life with those of other members of the species. But this is a problematic 
account (McMahan 1996: 3-35). It seems necessary to admit that the ap-
peal in this sense to the potential of the species proves implausible for its 
speciecist bases. Refer the fortune to this way of understanding potential 
means disregarding the requirement of moral neutrality of the species. 
Furthermore, it is easy to recognize certain practical implications of this 
proposal that are questionable. Jeff McMahan (2002: 147-149) proposes 
that we take note of the counterintuitive consequences implicit in assum-
ing the Species-Norm Account (SNA) analyzing two hypothetical 
situations. Let’s consider, he proposes, that our current technology could 
enable us to create a superchimpanzee by genetic modifications. Let’s 
envisage in this way that the animal attains cognitive and emotional ca-
pacities parallel to those of a ten-year-old human. Let’s also assume that 
that after a time it suffers brain damage that reverts its mental capacity to 
that of a normal chimp. As a second hypothetical situation, we concede 
that chimps are in danger of extinction at the same time as the character-
istics of those treated with enhancement are hereditary. As a result, the 
great majority of the individuals belonging to this species would have very 
high mental capacities. Consequently, if being considered unfortunate (a 
very low level of fortune) depends on an individual’s abilities and capaci-
ties being below what are considered normal for the species, then, in the 
first hypothetical situation, we would have to concede that the superchimp 
could not be considered unfortunate as a result of the loss of its mental 
capacity. And in the second situation, what is implied is to have to argue 
that the chimps that underwent no enhancement had a lower degree of 
fortune (they are unfortunate). The conclusion is that we are arbitrarily 
mixing the analysis of what we should define as fortune with the fact of 
being a member of a certain species. Given the arbitrariness, we shall have 
to admit that this strategy to establish a morally relevant difference between 
nonhuman animals and the mentally disabled, with respect to the enhance-
ment prescriptions, fails.
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9. coNclusIoN
Throughout this text we have sought to identify the arguments which 
would defend the stance that to assume a normative focus where factual 
equality and distributive justice are the central theme would in practice 
require sentient animals to be compensated in a sense similar to what we 
believe should be done with humans who have been less fortunate in the 
natural lottery with respect to their capacity (opportunities) for wellbeing. 
Clearly, some criticise an egalitarian approach, rejecting any demand for 
equality. This could be argued also from the standpoint of whether the 
idea that equality must be promoted in a significant way implies or not 
that it must be maximized. However, despite this, we could consider that 
this way of interpreting justice is highly plausible. Peter Vallentyne (2005: 
403-433) has delved into the moral obligations to animals that would 
derive from the adoption of any moral theory which concedes a significant 
interest to the fact of providing benefits to those whose level of wellbeing 
(capacity) is low in some way. This author argues that the assumption of 
some form of egalitarianism in a broadened moral community seems to 
lead to what has been called the problematic conclusion. That is, the 
moral would require an immense movement of resources from the major-
ity of humans to nonhuman sentient animals.
Among such resources would be techniques of cognitive enhancement, 
as we anticipated from the beginning. Also, we warned that the counter-
intuitive aspect of the moral prescription of improving the capacity for 
wellbeing is not sufficient to invalidate the argument insomuch that it 
could follow a strong prejudice in favour of the members of our species. 
But, what would happen if we appealed to the consequences? A normative 
scheme where factual equality takes centre stage could be compatible with 
a consequential element from which to be able to avoid situations where 
the members of the moral community are substantially harmed.
The question is: what form would a proposal take to ensure the fulfil-
ment of individual rights (such as the right to equality) but not to the 
point where its provision would infringe on other rights of individuals 
of more prominence?
We could claim a conception of moral rights that, protecting the 
individual wellbeing from those that form part of the game of justice 
preventing it from being submitted to considerations of general wellbe-
ing, takes into account the result of the decisions of the rational agents. 
The way in which these two elements could be combined is to interpret 
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the rights as restrictions to utilitarian considerations that acquire the bet-
ter basis in their utility itself (Lara 2007). That is, moral rights would be 
binding when they promote respect for morally valuable beings, but 
would lose their force when they imply an insurmountable obstacle to 
achieving this goal. This way of justifying the moral rights has the advan-
tage of giving us a tool to deal with conflicts. When their follow-up gives 
rise to a situation in which all of those entitled are paradoxically less re-
spected, and only in this case, noncompliance would be justified.
The enormous quantity of resources described in the problematic 
conclusion (Vallentyne 2005) move us to surmise that this would be one 
of the situations covered in the normative proposal of the utility of rights. 
This translates into situations in which the follow-up of a right would 
constitute a serious impediment for the fulfilment of the rest of the rights 
of all the members of the moral community (rights of greater weight, 
even for those affected, such as the basic right not to suffer). This perspec-
tive provides us a non-speciecist theoretical tool that legitimizes us to 
limit such problematic moral prescriptions towards sentient animals, 
members with full rights to the moral community.
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